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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 - 2 - 2 (3) (j)
(2002). This Court granted certiorari on November 29,2005.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
Whether Dessert Diversified Development had the authority as a beneficial
owner to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions?
This is an appeal from a summary judgment. The standard of review is to
review the issues of law for correctness with no deference to the trial court.
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2002 UT 8, para. 20, 70 P.3d 1, 6.
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING ISSUE WAS PRESERVED
Power of a Trust Beneficiary to Deal with Trust Assets. R-00380 ("Ruling
and Order").
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 ("Utah Statute of Frauds")(1998):
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not one
5

year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing."
Utah Code Ann. sec. 38 - 9 - 1 (6) (Wrongful Lien, "Definitions") (2005):
""Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time
it is recorded or filed is not: .
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the
owner of the real property."
Utah Code Ann. sec. 57- 1 - 12 ("Form of warranty deed - Effect") (2000).
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of
the premises therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and
privileges thereunto belonging, . . . ."
Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 3 - 1 0 3 ("Effect of failure to record") (2000).
"Every document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and
for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded."
Utah Code Ann. sec. 6 8 - 3 - 1 ("Common law adopted") (2004).
"The common law of England so far as it was not repugnant to, or in
conflict with, the constitution of laws of the United States, or the
constitution or laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and
6

adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the
necessities of the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of
decision in all courts of this state.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1965 F.E. Bates and his wife, Mae P. Bates, deeded 4,264.68 acres (more
or less) in Summit County, Utah, by warranty deed to "Security Title Company,
Trustee, a corporation of Utah." A copy of the 1965 Bates deed is Addendum
Document "1." [R-00172]. There is no contemporary evidence that a trust
actually existed or who may have been the beneficiaries in 1965. There is no
evidence of the terms of the trust. No trust document (e.g., will or declaration of
trust) has ever been produced.
Six years later, on March 18,1971, Deseret Diversified Development
("Deseret") was incorporated in Utah.
Four months later, on July 8,1971, Deseret executed and recorded a set of
CC&R's ("Reservations and Restrictive Covenants Forest Meadow Ranch")
against "The South half of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian " [R-0023 et seq., "Original 1971 CC&R's"]. These CC&R's
were then amended by whiting out and typing over the word "South" in the
property description so it read "The South half of Section 22, Township 1 North,
Range 4 East." The amended CC&R's were recorded on August 19,1971 (the
7

"Rerecorded CC&R's," R-00448 et seq.). A copy is attached as Addendum
document "2."
The Court of Appeals states as a fact that the amendment was made by Mr.
W. Brent Jensen, the individual who signed the original CC&R's, but, the record
does not show who actually did it. Petitioner cannot prove W. Brent Jensen didn't
do it, but respectfully reminds the Court that the rule of law is that all factual
inferences are to be drawn in its favor.1
The Rerecorded CC&R's do not provide for annual assessments. They are
"development CC&R's" that contemplate that the 320 acres will be sold in bulk to
homebuilders and developers who will then work together to develop the area.
They provide for assessments for development expenses (e.g., for roads and
infrastructure) to be prorated by acreage, not for annual maintenance assessments
to be prorated by lot.
The area covered by the Rerecorded CC&R's is the south half of Section 22,
roughly 320 of the 4,264.68 acres conveyed by the Bates Deed. The area is a
rectangle roughly one mile wide west to east and half a mile wide north to south.
About a year later, on August 9,1972, Security Title recorded the "Plat for
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D," Appendix document "3"[ R-00023-26]. The south
1

Black v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004 UT 66 para. 23,100 P.3d 1163,1166.
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east corner of the platted area is inside the rectangular area covered by the
Rerecorded CC&R's, but most of the platted area is not. Most of the platted area
is either in the north half of Section 22 or in Section 21 to the west. The
relationship of the platted area to the rectangular area is shown in the map which is
Appendix document "4" [R-0059].
Both Security Title and Deseret Diversified signed the plat's "Owner's
Dedication," which reads as follows:
"

OWNER'S DEDICATION

"Know all men by these presents that we, the four undersigned owners of
the above described tract of land, having caused the same to be subdivided
into lots and streets hereafter to be known as: FOREST MEADOW RANCH
PLAT 'D' do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of
land shown on this plat as intended for public use.
Deseret Diversified
Development Corporation by

/s/ W. Brent Jensen
W. Brent Jensen, President
/s/ Lee Ann Hunter
Secretary

Security Title Company,
as Trustee by

/s/ Leo D. Jensen
Vice President
/s/L.R. Wright
Secretary

The Court of Appeals states that W. Brent Jensen signed the plat for both
Deseret and Security Title as the president of both corporations, but that is false.

9

The truth is that Leo D. Jensen signed for Security Title as its vice president.2
The Court of Appeals then held that this false fact (i.e., that W. Brent Jensen had
signed the plat as president of both Security Title and Deseret) proved as a matter
of law that (1) there actually was a trust in 1965, (2) the beneficiaries of that trust
in 1965 were "the interests that became Deseret," and (3) Deseret had become the
trust beneficiary in 1971.
On January 15,1975, Security Title conveyed lot 105 in the platted area
(1 .e., Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D) to Jensen Investment. The Court of Appeals
held that Jensen Investment was another corporation controlled by W. Brent
Jensen. The record does not show this, but, in fact, W. Brent Jensen was an
incorporator and initial director of Jensen Investment. The subsequent deed from
Jensen Investment to its grantee was signed by "Kent Jensen" [R-0043].3
Lot 105 was subsequently divided into lot 105 and lot 105A. Lot 105A is
Petitioner's lot. The southern part of the lot is covered by the Rerecorded

2

Petitioner has obtained a certified copy of Security Title's complete file
from the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and the name W.
Brent Jensen does not appear as incorporator, director or officer at any time. In
fact, his name does not appear at all.
3

Petitioner has obtained a certified copy of Jensen Investment's complete
filefromthe Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and W. Brent
Jensen is shown as an incorporator and initial director.
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CC&R's. The northern part is not. The relationship of lot 105A to the rectangular
area covered by the Rereccorded CC&R's and to the irregular outline of the
subdivision is shown by the map, Addendum document "4" [R-0059].
Lot 105 A was eventually conveyed by warranty deed to Axel Grabowski,
Petitioner's president, who conveyed it to Petitioner on December 9,1999.
In 1980 Respondent recorded a Notice of Lien in which it claimed authority
to make annual assessments against Lot 105A under the Rerecorded CC&R's. A
copy of the 1980 Notice of Lien is attached as Addendum Document "5" [R0050].
For many years Respondent did not make any assessments (neither for
annual maintenance nor for development expenses) against the lots in the South
half of Section 22 or against the lots in the Forest Meadow Subdivisions. The
roads and other improvements were maintained by a Summit County Special
Service District which used its taxing authority to collect the necessary money.
This made the question of the validity of the Rerecorded CC&R's moot. But, in
late 1999 Summit County decided to dissolve the special service district and
Respondent announced it was going to start making annual assessments. In
December, 1999, before Respondent had made any assessments, Petitioner filed a
petition to have the 1980 Notice of Lien declared wrongful lien under the Utah
11

Wrongful Lien Statute4 on the grounds that neither it nor the Rerecorded CC&R's
had been signed by the owner of record, Security Title. Respondent countered that
the 1980 Notice of Lien was authorized by the Rerecorded CC&R's and they were
valid because they had been signed by Deseret as the beneficiary of the trust
evidenced by the Bates Deed and on other grounds.
Petitioner and Respondent both moved for summary judgment on the basis
of the recorded documents - the Bates Deed, the Rerecorded CC&R's, the Plat,
the 1980 Notice of Lien and the deeds in Petitioner's chain of title. The trial court
denied Petitioner's motion and granted Respondent's motion.
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals Petitioner argued:
(1) the Rerecorded CC&R's were void under the Utah Statute of Frauds because
they were not been signed and acknowledged after the property description was
changed, (2) there was no trust because there was no identifiable trust beneficiary,
trust document or terms of trust in 1965, (3) Deseret could not have been the trust
beneficiary in 1965 because it was not incorporated until 1971, (3) there was no
evidence that Deseret had become the trust beneficiary in 1971 when the
Rerecorded CC&R's were recorded, (4) assuming Deseret was the trust
beneficiary in 1971 and the 320 acres were trust property, Deseret had no
4

Utah Code Ann. sec. 38 - 9 -1 et seq. (2005).
12

authority as trust beneficiary to bind the land with CC&R's, (5) since the trustee
held the land in fee simple estate, Deseret as trust beneficiary had no estate and,
therefore, could not be in privity of estate with subsequent purchasers from
Security Title, and (6) the Rerecorded CC&R's were void for non-uniformity
because they only covered a small part of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D.
The Court of Appeals rejected all Petitioner's arguments. It held that the
plat had been signed for Security Title by W. Brent Jensen as its president (this
was false) and since W. Brent Jensen also signed for Deseret Diversified, this
proved as a matter of law that "the interests that became Deseret Diversified" were
the trust beneficiaries in 1965 and that Deseret Diversified was the trust
beneficiary in 1971. It further held that as trust beneficiary Deseret Diversified
had authority to impose binding CC&R's on the land and was in privity of estate
with subsequent purchasers from Security Title. It went on to hold that even if
Deseret Diversified did not have authority to impose the CC&R's as trust
beneficiary, Security Title had subsequently ratified the Rerecorded CC&R's by
signing and recording the plat. Finally, it held that the record did not show there
was any nommiformity.
Petitioner sought certiorari as to all these rulings. On November 29,2005,
this Court granted certiorari limited to the issue:
13

"Whether Deseret Diversified Development had authority as a beneficial
owner to impose binding covenants, conditions, and restrictions."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
All the relevant facts are stated in the foregoing Statement of the case
and Petitioner incorporates them by this reference.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In summary, Petitioner argues:
(1) The law makes no distinction between authority to impose binding
covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&R's") on land and other powers of
disposition.
(2) A trust beneficiary (although a beneficial owner) has no power of
disposition over trust property because the rule of law is that "the trustee has
exclusive control over trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by
law or the trust instrument."
(3) Because the names of the trust beneficiaries usually do not appear in the
real estate records (as illustrated by this case), holding that a trust beneficiary has
power of disposition over trust real property will compromise the integrity of the
Utah recording system.
(4) Holding that a trust beneficiary has power of disposition over trust
14

property will defeat the fundamental basic purpose of trusts - to divide beneficial
ownership from control of the property to protect the interests of the beneficiary.
(5) Security Title did not "ratify" the Rerecorded CC&R's" by signing and
recording the plat because (a) the CC&R's and the plat cover inconsistent areas
and have inconsistent purposes, (b) even if Deseret was the beneficiary of Security
Title, it was not the agent of Security Title, and (c) Deseret did not purport to act
for Security Title.
ARGUMENTS
1. The law makes no distinction between authority to impose binding
covenants, conditions and restrictions on land and other powers of
disposition.
The issue framed by this Court is "whether Deseret Diversified
Development had authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants,
conditions, and restrictions." This issue leads immediately to the question of
whether imposing binding covenants, conditions, and restrictions on land is
materially different from disposing of land in some other way - e.g., imposing an
easement, imposing an equitable servitude, or simply selling the land.
The law makes no distinction between one sort of disposition of land and
another. The Utah Statute of Frauds provides:
15

"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared other wise than by operation of law or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing." [Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 (1998)].
Covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&R's) are interests in real property in
the nature of real covenants (promises to do), equitable servitudes (promises not to
do), and easements (non-possessory interests). The law treats them all alike
because, as a practical matter, authority to impose binding CC&R's is authority to
determine how land will be used. For example, suppose land is held in trust by T
for the benefit of B. As trustee T determines that the most valuable use of the land
is as a farm. If B as beneficial owner has authority to impose binding CC&R's
limiting the land to residential development, T cannot fulfill the trustee's duty to
manage the land as a farm.
In effect, the decision to impose binding CC&R's is just one of many
economic decisions the trustee must make as trustee. The law cannot carve out the
particular economic decision to impose binding CC&R's and treat it differently
from all the other economic decisions the trustee must make.
2. The long established rule is that "the trustee has exclusive control
over the trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the
16

trust instrument," and the word "exclusive" precludes the beneficiary from
haying any power of disposition.
This Court has said three times that "the trustee has exclusive control over
the trust property subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the trust
instrument."5 This is the uniform American rule.6 It is based on the fundamental
principle of trust law that the trustee is responsible for the trust property (and the
beneficiary is not) because the trustee has control (and the beneficiary does not).
It is true that the beneficiary is the beneficial owner of the trust property, but
this only means that the trust beneficiary has the risk of loss and chance of gain,
not that the beneficiary has power of disposition. "Property" in land is frequently
compared to a bundle of sticks, each stick representing a specific right with
respect to the land. The trust beneficiary has the "stick" of risk of loss and chance
of gain (beneficial ownership) but the trustee has the "stick" of power of
disposition (exclusive control).
A good analogy to beneficiaries of trust are shareholders of publicly held
corporations. The shareholders are the beneficial owners of the corporations'
5

In Re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, para. 12, 71 P.3d 589, 594; Matter of
Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1997); Continental Bank & Trust Co, v.
Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P. 872 (Utah 1981).
6

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS sec
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2 (1959).

assets because they have risk of loss and chance of gain, but they have no control
over those assets. The board of directors has control. The analogy of corporate
law to trust law is so close that corporate law speaks of the duties of the board of
directors to shareholders as "fiduciary" duties.
Trust law regards the property interest of the beneficiary not as an interest in
the trust property but as an interest in the trust itself. Thus, trust beneficiaries of
non-spendthrift trusts have authority to dispose of their interests in the trust (in
effect, to substitute their transferees as trust beneficiaries) but not the power to
dispose of the trust property.7 Again, shareholders of publicly-held corporations
are a good analogy. The shareholders have authority to sell their shares, but not to
sell the corporations' assets.
This division of beneficial ownership (held by the beneficiary) from control
(held by the trustee) has been the rule of law for centuries. This Court should not
change it now because stare decisis is important in trust law. Past trust settlors
and their attorneys have relied on the established rule of law. They did not
anticipate that the Utah Appellate Court would hold trust beneficiaries have power
of disposition over trust property. If this Court confirms the existence of this new

7

See GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS 132-42 (sec. 37 "Nature of Beneficiary's
Interest" and Sec. 137 "Incidents of the beneficiary's Interest") (6th ed. 1987).
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power, the trustees of these established trusts will not be able to protect their
beneficiaries from the consequences of their beneficiaries' improvidence.
3. The decision of this Court in Capital Assets Financial Services v.
Maxwell does not stand for the proposition that beneficiaries have power of
disposition over trust property.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that a trust beneficiary has power of
disposition in the following paragraph:
"Petitioner next argues that because Deseret had only a beneficial
interest in the land granted in the Bates Deed, Deseret could not encumber
Lot 105A. However, Petitioner cites no authority stating that a beneficiary
cannot encumber the trust res. In fact, there is authority to the contrary.
See Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell 2000 UT 9, para. 17,994 P.2d
201 (holding beneficial interest in real property could encumber that
interest). In any event, we will not lose sight of the forest for the trees.
Deseret's actions were subsequently ratified by Security when Deseret and
Security filed Plat D." [2005 UT App 294, para. 36]
It is true that Petitioner cited no authority to the effect that a trust beneficiary
cannot encumber trust property, but the absence of negative authority is not the
same thing as positive authority. The common law rule is that the trustee has
exclusive control, and Utah adopted the common law rule in 1898 by statute.8 The
8

Utah Code Ann. sec. 6 8 - 3 - 1 ("Common law adopted") (2004). The
common law rale governed in 1965 when the Bates Deed was delivered. Utah
enacted the common law rule as the statutory rule in 1975 by enacting the Uniform
Trustee's Powers Provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, Utah Code Ann. sec.
75-7-40 etseq. (1993).
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critical question is "what did the Utah Supreme Court actually hold in the case the
Court of Appeals cites as positive authority, Capital Assets Financial Services v.
MaxwellT
The facts in Capital Assets Financial Services are simple. A judgment had
been entered against Christensen in favor of Lindsay. Christensen, the judgment
debtor, wanted to borrow $50,000, so he asked a friend to transfer some real
property to him to use as collateral. Lott, the daughter of thefriend,provided the
collateral by transferring some land to Christensen by unqualified quitclaim deed
on the understanding that he would use it as collateral and then deed it back to her.
Christensen obtained the $50,000 loan from Capital Assets on a deed of trust and
then deeded the land (now subject to Capital Assets' deed of trust) back to Lott.
Lindsay (Christensen's judgment creditor) claimed that as soon as Lott
transferred the land to Christensen by quitclaim deed, his judgment lien attached
and therefore Capital Assets' deed of trust was subordinate. Capital Assets
countered with the argument that Christensen had taken the land as a trustee for
the benefit of Lott as trust beneficiary, and, therefore, no judgment lien attached
under the established rule that a judgment lien does not attach to trust property
held by a trustee in trust for the benefit of another person.
This Court refused to characterize the relationship between Christensen and
20

Lott as a trust. In paragraph "17" this Court held:
"There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal title
possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial interest that Christensen
undisputably possessed here. Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is purely for the
benefit of another. In the instant case, Christensen received from Lott more
than bare legal title. The quitclaim deed was consistent with passing a fee
interest and the intent of the parties was to allow Christensen to use the
property as security for his own benefit. To hold that Christensen's interest
was a non-beneficial "bare legal title" would be inconsistent with chain of
title and the intent of the parties." [2000 UT 9, para. 17, 994 P.2d 201,205].
This is the same paragraph "17" that was cited by the Court of Appeals as holding
that a trust beneficiary has power of disposition over trust property.
It is impossible to reconcile this Court's actual holding (that there was no
trust) with the Court of Appeals' statement of the holding (that a trust beneficiary
has power to encumber). No reasonable person could have drawn the Court of
Appeal's holding from the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the range of
"innocent mistake" or even "negligent mistake." The truth is sometimes a matter
of degree - as when the defendant claimed he didn't know the revolver was loaded
when he accidentally shot his wife - six times.
Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to think about the question of why the
Court of Appeals so mischaracterized this Court's holding. The degree of falsity
is on a par with its holding that W. Brent Jensen signed the plat for Security Title

21

when the document was actually signed by Leo D. Jensen. Could any Utah judge
write the words "[W. Brent] Jensen signed on behalf of both Security and Deseret"
without reading the plat? Could any Utah judge write the words "holding
beneficial interest in real property could encumber that interest" without reading
this Court's opinion? If the Court of Appeals did read the plat and the opinion,
why did it make these false statements?
4. Holding that trust beneficiaries have power of disposition over real
property held in trust will compromise the integrity of the Utah recording
system.
The holding of the Court of Appeals in this case is extraordinary in that it
gives Deseret as trust beneficiary the authority to impose binding CC&R's even
though its status as trust beneficiary does not appear of record. In fact, there is no
indication in the record of who was the trust beneficiary in 1965 or in 1971. The
only way the Court of Appeals could justify its holding Deseret was a trust
beneficiary in 1971 was to falsely describe W. Brent Jensen as signing the plat for
Security Title as its president (when the plat was actually signed by Leo D. Jensen
as its vice president) and then, without citing any rule of law, to hold that this false
fact proved as a matter of law that the interests that became Deseret were the trust
beneficiaries in 1965 and that Deseret was the trust beneficiary in 1971.
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Under Utah real property law, if a person other than the record owner has
power of disposition over Utah real property, the expectation is that the power will
appear of record. For example, if X gives Y power of disposition over land held
of record by X, the expectation is that X will record a written power of attorney
naming Y as X's agent, describing the property, and expressly granting Y power
of disposition.
Any power of disposition that is valid but not of record threatens the
integrity of the Utah recording system because the exercise of that power will be
by a deed that is both wild and valid.
The point is best explained in three steps. The first step is to explain why
trust instruments with respect to real property are virtually never recorded. This
may strike the Court as strange because the Utah Statute of Frauds expressly
requires a written document to create a trust with respect to real property. Why is
it the uniform practice not to record these written documents?
Three good reasons are: (1) recording is a meaningless gesture, (2)
recording makes any subsequent transferee's title less secure, and (3) recording
makes information public that most people prefer to keep private.
On the first reason, suppose land is deeded to "T as trustee." Does it matter
whether there actually is a trust or not? It does not. If there is no trust, T has
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exclusive control over the land as both record and beneficial owner.9 If there is a
trust, T has exclusive control over the land as trustee. Therefore, whether there
actually is a trust or not (or what the terms of the trust may be, or who the
beneficiaries of the trust may be) is of absolutely no importance at to anyone with
whom the trustee deals. Recording the trust is a meaningless gesture.
As for the second reason - that recording makes any transferee's title less
secure - suppose the trust document is recorded and then the trustee sells the
property in possible violation of the terms of the trust. The person who bought the
land may have acquired defective title due to constructive notice (due to the trust
having been recorded) of the violation.10 The transferee's title is safer if the trust
document is not recorded.
On the third reason, recording a trust makes the trust a public document.
Criminals and nosey people may read the document and use the information they
obtain to make trouble for the trust beneficiaries and their families.
So, the uniform practice is not to record the trust instrument even though the
Utah Statute of Frauds requires that a trust in any manner relating to real property
9

This is the effect of Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 1 - 1 2 ("Form of warranty
deed - Effect") and 57 -1 -13 ("Form of quitclaim deed - Effect") (2000).
10

See Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1 - 406 ("Third persons protected in dealing
with trustee") and sec. 75 - 7 - 409 (2) (1993).
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be in writing.
The second step of the analysis is to see that while the actual existence of
the trust is irrelevant if the trustee has exclusive control (whether as absolute
owner or as trustee), it makes a great deal of difference if the trust beneficiary has
power of disposition. If deeding land to "T as trustee" gives power of disposition
to unnamed beneficiaries, then it very much matters whether there actually is a
trust, what the terms of the trust are, and who are the beneficiaries.
Please note that a deed to "T as trustee" (like the 1965 Bates deed in this
case) is insufficient to create a trust in itself because it does not name the
beneficiaries or state the terms of the trust. It just conveys the property to T.11
The third step is to understand the logic of the Utah recording system. The
logic goes in a three stage process like the game of baseball.
In baseball the fist stage is for the pitcher to throw the ball over the plate. If
the pitcher can't do this, the batter gets to go to first base without even trying to hit
the ball. However, if the pitcher throws the ball over the plate, the game goes to
the second stage. The batter has to hit the ball. If the batter doesn't hit the ball

11

It would, of course, be possible to create a trust by a deed that designated
the grantee as trustee, identified the beneficiaries, stated the terms of the trust and
conveyed the land as trust property, Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1 - 409 (l)(a)
(1993), see GEORGE A. BOGART, TRUSTS 22 (Sec. 10 (b) (6th ed. 1987).
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(and it crosses the plate three times), the batter is out without thefielderseven
trying to make a play. But if the batter does hit the ball, the game goes to the third
stage. Thefieldershave to make a play.
Each stage is reached if and only if the prior step is accomplished. If the
pitcher doesn't throw the ball over the plate, the batter can stand there looking at
the clouds. If the batter doesn't hit the ball, thefielderscan pass their time playing
video games.
The Utah Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act sets up a similar
three stage process. The fist stage is for the person asserting the interest in real
property to produce the written instrument creating that interest. In this case, that
written instrument would be a trust document naming Security Title as trustee,
naming the beneficiaries, and stating the terms of the trust.
If Respondent had produced that trust document (if effect, throwing the ball
over the plate), the law would go to the second stage. Petitioner could claim the
trust document was void as to it under the Utah Recording Act because it was
never recorded.12 If Petitioner made that claim (in effect, hitting the ball), the law
would go on to the third stage. It would be up to Respondent to show that
Petitioner could have discovered the trust document by reasonable inquiry (in
12

Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 3 -103 ("Effect of failure to record") (2000).
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effect, making a play).
The point is that Respondent has not produced the trust document. The first
stage of the law was never accomplished. Therefore, under the express language
of the Utah Statute of Frauds, Deseret's power of disposition over real property
was never validly created even if Deseret was the actual beneficiary of the trust.
Deseret can be the actual trust beneficiary without compromising the integrity of
the Utah recording system, but it can't have authority to impose binding CC&R's
without compromising the integrity of the Utah recording system.
The Utah Court of Appeals dealt with the three stage process of the Utah
recording system by ignoring the first stage. In effect, it held that the word
"trustee" on the Bates deed put Petitioner on inquiry notice that there might be a
trust. This is perfectly true but totally insufficient. Petitioner being put on notice
that there might be a trust is not the same thing as Respondent producing the trust
document. Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, no trust document, no trust.
Respondent never threw the ball over the plate.
Finally, the reason why the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals will
destroy the integrity of the Utah recording system is that when a deed shows that
land is held in trust (e.g., by "T as trustee under the X family trust dated January 1,
2006"), and someone records a wild deed purporting to dispose of the land in some
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way (e.g., by imposing CC&R's) the record will not show whether the person
recording the wild deed was or was not a trust beneficiary because the trust
document will not have been recorded. But, under the holding of the Court of
Appeals, even if the trust document is never produced (as it has never been
produced in this case), if the trial court thinks that the person signing the wild
deed actually was a trust beneficiary (perhaps not on fabricated evidence as in this
case, but on some valid evidence), the trial court must validate the wild deed.
5. Holding that trust beneficiaries have power of disposition over trust
property will defeat the basic purpose of trusts - to protect the beneficiary's
beneficial ownership by holding the trustee responsible for the control of the
trust property.
The basic purpose of a trust is to protect the beneficiary's beneficial
ownership of the trust property by holding the trustee responsible for the control
of the trust property. People do not create trusts because they want the
beneficiaries to have control of the trust property. They create trusts because they
want the trustees to have control of the trust property.
"Control of the trust property" means making decisions with respect to the
trust property - decisions like whether land is to be developed for residential use,
or farmed, or rented out, or sold, or whatever. "Control of the trust property" can
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be more complicated than simply maximizing economic value. For example, a
trust instrument may make the trustee responsible for managing a farm while
preserving it as a farm and not turning it into something like a subdivision.
If the trust beneficiary has authority to impose binding CC&R's (or any
similar power of disposition), the trustee cannot fulfill the duty imposed by the
terms of the trust. For example, suppose that a married couple, are getting on in
years and set up an estate plan in the form of an intervivos trust. The general
terms of the trust are income to them for their joint lives, income to the surviving
spouse for life, and on the death of the surviving spouse for the trust property to be
distributed to their children. This Court dealt with this sort of trust in 2003 in In
Re Estate ofFlake.13 Anyway, the married couple are the initial trustees but after
some years they decide to turn over the job to one of their sons because they no
longer trust their own judgments. Then the husband dies. More years pass and the
surviving wife is now 90 years old and somewhat forgetful. She lives in a
retirement community and leaves all financial decisions to her son as trustee - but
she does not lack the legal capacity to make a contract..
The surviving wife is the sole income beneficiary. The children have future
reminder interests but the son as trustee has power to invade corpus as he
13

2003UT17,71P.3d589.
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considers necessary or appropriate for the health and welfare of his mother. The
trust is irrevocable and cannot be amended. Finally, the trust says nothing about
whether the surviving spouse has any power of disposition over the trust assets.
One of the assets held in trust is a tract of land title to which is held of
record by the son "as trustee under the X Family Trust." The declaration of trust
was not recorded.
The issue is whether the surviving wife as beneficial owner has authority to
impose binding CC&R's on the tract of land - exactly the same issue as in this
case but with a complete factual setting, an actual trust document and known
beneficiaries.
There is no conceivable reason why the established rule of law (that the
trustee has the exclusive control over the trust property subject to the terms of the
trust instrument and the law) should be overturned to give such a power to the
surviving wife. The whole purpose of the trust is for the son to be responsible for
making all the economic decisions. The economic decision to impose binding
CC&R's cannot be pulled out and treated differently than the others.
The law will have to go either all one way or all the other - either stay with
the established rule that the trustee has exclusive control or permit the trust
beneficiary to make whatever economic decisions she wants. If the law takes the
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latter route, the son cannot protect his mother from evil people who prey on the
elderly.
Sometimes courts don't appreciate the practical consequences of the
decisions they make for the very best abstract reasons. In the world of legal
abstractions, its seems plausible that the beneficial owner of land should be able to
dispose of it in whatever way she pleases. But, on a practical level, how many
Californian hunters would come to Utah if Utah declared open season on hunting
deer? And as a practical matter, what will happen if this Court declares open
season on hunting elderly trust beneficiaries?
6. Security Title did not "ratify" the Rerecorded CC&R's by signing
the plat because (1) Deseret was not its agent, (2) Deseret did not purport to
act for Security Title, (3) the Utah Statute of Frauds requires any agency with
respect to real property to be in writing, and (4) the plat and the Rerecorded
CC&R's are inconsistent with each other.
The Court of Appeals decided this case on alternative grounds - (1) that
Deseret as beneficial owner had authority to impose binding CC&R's, and (2) that
Security Title "ratified" the Rerecorded CC&R's by signing and recording the
plat. But, this Court limited certiorari to one issue, "whether Deseret Diversified
Development had the authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants,
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conditions, and restrictions." This limitation raises the question of whether this
Court sent Petitioner on a fool's errand because even if Petitioner persuades the
Court that Deseret did not have direct authority as trust beneficiary, this Court will
not permit Petitioner to challenge the alternative grounds.
Petitioner does not believe it has been sent on a fool's errand because both
grounds of decision go to "authority" - to the authority of the beneficiary to
impose binding CC&R's on its own behalf (the first grounds) or to the authority of
the beneficiary to do so on behalf of its trustee (the alternative grounds).
"Ratification" in the sense of confirming the actions of a person who
purportedly acted for another is a matter of agency law. In trust law, "ratification"
is not used in this way, but to mean that the beneficiary is estopped from
challenging a trustee who did an act otherwise in violation of the trust instrument
if the beneficiary with capacity approved it.14 For example, suppose the sole
beneficiary has legal capacity and owns a diversified portfolio of investments in
addition to the trust property. The beneficiary wants the trustee to invest without
regard to diversification because the beneficiary is already well diversified outside
the trust, so the beneficiary asks the trustee not to diversify, but to pick one

14

See generally, GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS 625 - 30 (sec. 168) (6th ed.

1987).
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common stock with potential for capital appreciation. The trustee does so
arguably in violation of the trustee's prudent person duty to diversify
investments.15
In the language of trust law, the beneficiary has "ratified" the trustee's
investment in one common stock. The beneficiary will be estopped from suing the
trustee if the common stock does not pan out. But in no sense did the beneficiary
act on behalf of the trustee. "Ratification" in trust law is not the same thing as
"ratification" in agency law.
Turning back to this case, the Court of Appeals used "ratification" in its
decision as a variety of agency law created by the trust relationship. It said:
"Fourth, Security, as trustee, ratified beneficiary Deseret's encumbrance of
Lot 105A." [2005 UT App 264, para. 39]
But, the trust relationship does not create agency authority in the beneficiary
to act on behalf of the trustee. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY says:
"Sec. 1. Agency; Principle; Agent
(1) Agency is thefiduciaryrelation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to his control, and the consent by the other so to act.

15

See Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1 - 302 (7) ("trustee shall diversify

(1993).
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")

(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent."16
A trust beneficiary does not agree to act for the benefit of and subject to the
control of the trustee. And, "of course, if no agency relationship exists at all, the
doctrine of ratification [i.e., agency variety] does not apply."17
Even if there were an agency relationship between Deseret and Security
Title, Security Title could not ratify the act of Deseret imposing the CC&R's
because Deseret did not purport to act on behalf of Security Title, but on its own
behalf. As the RESTATEMENT says:
"Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind
him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the
act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by
him."18 [emphasis added].
The "purporting" rule may seem antiquated, but it plays an important role in real
property law by preserving the chain of title. If Deseret had signed the CC&R's as
"Security Title Company, trustee, by Deseret Diversified Development, its
authorized agent," the CC&R's would have been indexed to Security Title in the
16
17

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,

sec. 1 (1958).

WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 82 (sec.

27, Ratification, In General) (3rd ed. 2001).
18

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY sec. 82 (1958).
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grantor/grantee index and they would not be a "wild deed."
Even if Deseret actually were the agent of Security Title, the Utah Statute of
Frauds requires that the agency be in writing. It is true that there are sufficient
indications in the record that Deseret may have been an agent of Security Title to
put Petitioner on inquiry notice, but, to return to the game of baseball, until
Respondent puts the ball over the plate by producing a written power of attorney,
Petitioner can just look at the clouds.
Finally, the most important reason for holding that there was no ratification
in this case is that the Rerecorded CC&R's are fundamentally inconsistent with the
plat. In effect, the Rerecorded CC&R's are what are known as "development
CC&R's." They do not cover a platted subdivision. They cover 320 acres of raw
land - the rectangular area constituting the south half of section 22. They
contemplate that this acreage will be sold by acre to people who will work
together to develop it. For example, the only assessments provided for are for
"development expenses" prorated by acreage,19 not maintenance expenses prorated by lot.
Next, please turn to the map, Addendum document "4." The plat and the
Rerecorded CC&R's do not cover the same geographic area. It makes no sense at
19

Rerecorded CC&R's para. 18.
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all to say that the plat "ratifies" a set of CC&R's that don't even apply to most of
the plat. Any reasonable person looking at actual provisions of the Rerecorded
CC&R's and the actual outline of the plat would conclude that Deseret had
originally intended to develop the south half of Section 22 in cooperation with
other developers, but then abandoned that plan. Security Title's signing and
recording the plat does not show it affirmed the Rerecorded CC&R's, but shows it
regarded them as invalid.
The Court of Appeals used the abstract term "ratification" as a verbal
justification for its conclusion, but, again, practical considerations must be taken
into account. As a practical matter, it is impossible to administer CC&R's that do
not cover the whole subdivision (and do cover land that is not in the subdivision),
that do not provide for annual maintenance assessments, and that do not provide
for who are to be the members of the homeowners' association or how they are to
vote. These practical considerations must have been known to Security Title and
Deseret when they platted the land and show that Deseret abandoned the
Rerecorded CC&R's and that Security Title regarded them as invalid. If Security
Title had actually wanted to impose the Rerecorded CC&R's on the south east
corner of the plat, all it had to do was sign and record a declaration to that effect.
As a title company, surely it knew how to do this.
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For the reasons stated above, this Court should hold that Deseret as
beneficial owner had no authority (whether directly as trust beneficiary or indirectly
on behalf of Security Title as its trustee) to impose binding covenants, conditions
and restrictions, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand to the trial
court for disposition of the case in accordance with its holding by entering judgment
that the 1980 Notice of Lien is a wrongful lien and invahd because it was not signed
by the owner of record and the Rerecorded CC&R's are not valid and binding.
Dated: January 12,2006.
Respectfully submitted:
/s/ Boyd KimrMTTfyer
f
ATTORN^YFOR PETITIONER/^PELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the forgoing
Opening Brief (Corrected) by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first
class postage prepaid, addressed to the following person:
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah §^111 -2216
Dated: January 12,2006
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "1" - THE 1965 BATES DEED

±01972,
at

.M. Fee Paid*

.

TJctSIfr—
Dcp. Boofc_

AAA^

Mail tax notice to_

fa

3:c'<.U.H3., ^-ilcrof

F , E. BATES, a l i o knovn
_r
vn a s F . Ephrala
B a t e a , and
HAE P. BATES, a l s o known a s Hae P r l t c h e t t B a t e s , b i s
Coalvllla
County of
Suszalt
and WARRANT

^ 168

^ ^ V n l ^ 1 Ui*

WARRANTY DEED
CONVEY

p

* grantor,
cantor aa
vlfe
State of Utah, hereof

to
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, TRUSTEE,
* C o r p o r a t i o n o f Utah
grantee

for the w a of

S a l t Lake

Cov-5tr

S a l t Lake C i t y

, State of Utah

TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER COOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

the following described C

of land in

BQMCXm

County,

Suraalt and Morgan

State cf Utah, cxwitx
The South h a l f o f S e c t i o n 16; t h e E a s t h a l f o f t h e S o u t h e a s t
q u a r t e r o f S e c t i o n 17; t h e Eciat h a l f o f the E a s t h a l f o f
S e c t i o n 2 0 ; a l l o f S e c t i o n s 2 1 , 2 2 , 27 and 2 8 ; t h e E a s t h a l f
o f t h e E a s t h a l f o f S e c t i o n 2 9 ; t h e North h a l f and t h e North
h a l f o f t h e South h a l f o f S e c t i o n 3 3 ; t h e North h a l f and t h e
N o r t h h a l f o f the S o u t h h a l f o£ S e c t i o n 3 4 ; a l l I n T o v n s h i p
1 N o r t h , Range A E a s t , S a l t Lake B a s e and H e r i d t a n ,
(Containing ^proximately 4264,68 a c r e s . )
TOGETHER WITH a l l v a t e r and v a t e r r i g h t s h o v e v c r e v i d e n c e d
a p p u r t e n a n t t o o r u s e d upon o r I n c o n n e c t i o n v l t h s a i d p r o p e r t y .
SUBJECT TO e a s e m e n t s , r e s t r i c t i o n s and r i g h t s o f v « y a p p e a r i n g
o f r e c o r d o r e n f o r c e a b l e In l a v and e q u i t y , and t a x e s f o r t h e
y e a r 1965 and t h e r e a f t e r .

WITNESS the hand sof said grantors, this

14 th

dar of

October

A.D.19 65.

Stgoed la oSe pretence of

STATE OP UTAH
COUNTY OP

SALT LAKE

SSL
On the 1 4 t h day of

October

A. D. 1965

peraonafly

appeared befere me F . E. BATES, a l s o knovn aa F . Ephralm B a t e s ,
mad HAS ?• BATES, a l s o knovn aa Ha« P r l t c h e t t
lute;
hia vlfa
the ctgncraof «ibe widSln Inatrument who duly acknowledged
tatnethacth* yexecated the SBSM.

'jCbrtniltaoo Expired
12/21/67

_____
_Re«MInf a t .

rJH±

S a l t Laka C l t . y , ^ T a h •

ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "2" - THE 1971 RERECORDED CC&R'S

•r^-

fctrrfl* (.13.788 . s_6«>i. .H..1?..

RECORDCD.fc.^-'/l .. tt? V M -•&$*?• W.

REQUEST of :«i>?.r^ .• ^ds..*. 1 ""* 0
FEE

VANCA. T WM6QS. lUMMIf CO t'COkOtft

[i9£».~ > B y ^ < a ^ < ^ | r ^ ^ ^ j w f K . .
4f1fc«ftCB .

RESERVATIONS -AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
FOREST MEADOW RANCH
KNOW ALL MhN KY THESE PRESENTS:
That D«s«ret Diversified Deve] npnif nr, a Utah Corporation, being
the ovmer of the following described premises, situated within the County
of Summit, State ©£ Utah, to-viti
The South half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; which will consist
of all the luts of the Torest Meadow Ranch Subdivision
within this area;
hereby desire to establish and limit the development, use and enjoyment
of the aforesaid land by making said premises subject to the following
express reservations, restrictions and covenants; to-wit:
1. The owner or occupent nf each and every lot of the above
described area, by acceptance of title theroto or by taking possession
thereof, regardless of whethor or not the conveyance specifically provides therefor, covenants and agrees to accept, be bound by, to act in
accordance with and not to abrogate or act in contradiction of any of the
reservations and restrictive covenants herein enumerated.
2. The Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association (FMRPOA)
shall and aTe hereby named responsible for the administration and entorcement of the reservations and restrictive covenants enumerated herein. For
that purpose the FMRPOA shall appoint or elect one or more persons to a
committee formed for the exclusive purpose of administrating and enforcing the provisions herein set forth. This committee shall be known as
the Environmental Control Committee (JECC) and is empowered to set up
reasonable rules and regulations to properly administer and enforce these
requirements„ Vhi* committee xhall also have the power to make reasonable exceptions, for cause showing, to anv and all reservations and
restrictive covenants horoin enumerated whether spocifically so provided
or not,
3. The minimum lot or parcel siic of said property shall be
twenty thousand square feet In area, therefore no property owner of said
property shall subdivide his lot O T lots in such a manner that any lot
or parcel shall be less than approximately one-half acre, more or less
in area; nevertheless. no resubdivision whatsoever of the lots and
layouts of Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivision shall be permissible within
five years unless acrompHshed by other than thrnngh public. Advertising,
however, in no event shall for sale signs or other visual displays ever
bo allowed on said property.
4. Only perxMHueiii structures, that arc in conformance with the
specifications and requirements of and after proper approval from the'
ECC, Summit County and any required State Agency or Organisation shall
be constructed, errected, moved on to, or maintained on said property.
Wo temporary structure of any kind or size shall be permittod except
(1) when used for a reasonable period to aid in the construction of an
approved structure, or (2) for brief vacation periods. The terra structure shall mean for this paragraph and for all other paragraphs of this
document the following: Any building, improvement, shack, tent, trailer,
mobile home, dwelling place> garage, storage shed, and any other type of
structure having similar characteristics of the aforementioned items. To
implement t h e p r o c e d u r e r e q u i r e d haTflin a prnp/*rry nwner <>b?ill f o l l o w

the following steps before taking any s t e p s towards p u t t i n g a structure

on h i s p r o p e r t y :

a) Check with the ECC t o obtain any prepared
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s or requirements for 3aid s t r u c t u r e s .

P. 03/05

i-M NU. 4dbblbfbU2

bj Submit preliminary plans to the ECC f or approval.
c) Submit evidence that a l l County and Srptfi rftquirrtmrtnr^
have been complied with*
dj After approval, proceed only in accordance with the
d i r e c t i o n s of and in compliance with the plans approved
by the BCC.
5. No structure c o n s t r u c t e d , e r e c t e d or maintained on any l o t
or portion thereof s h a l l c o n s i s t of l e s s than 400 square f e e t of l i v i n g
area, not including carport or garages.
6. Only one dwelling w i l l be p e r m i t t e d per one-half a c r c t /
although a c l u s t e r i n g of d w e l l i n g s wei l l bo p e r m i t t e d on m u l t i - a c r e l o t s
when approved by the ECC* S p e c i a l v ^ n i s s i o n must be obtained from the
ECC, before more than two s t r u c t u r e s of any kind or s i z e s h a l l be permitted on any l o t , regardless of the l e t s i z e .
7. No s t r u c t u r e , or any paTt t h e r e o f , s h a l l be c o n s t r u c t e d ,
erected or maintained on any l o t c l o s e r than one hundred (100) f«ftt.
to Any l o t boundary l i n e or road r i g h t - o f - w a y .
8. NO s i g n s or other advertisements s h a l l be erected or
maintained on s a i d property or any s t r u c t u r e thereon*
9. No animals, except a reasonable number of domestic p e t s
(dogs, c a t s , e t c . ) horses and l i v e s t o c k , may be k e p t , bred, or r a i s e d on
said property; nor may any animal including the above exceptions be k e p t ,
bred or raised for any commercial purposes on s a i d property. The ECC
s h a l l determine what is a reasonable number.
10. Mo garbage, r e f u g e , obnoxious or o f f e n s i v e material or
o b j e c t s , weeds or any other u n s i g h t l y growth s h a l l be permitted to accumu l a t e , grow or remain on any s a i d l o t s . The p r o p e r t y owner s h a l l d i s p o s e
of any of the above described c o n d i t i o n s mid i t e m s i n accordance w i t h
accepted s a n i t a r y p r a c t i c e s and i n accordance w i t h the ECC r u l e s and
requirements, in the event any property owneT f a i l s t o k^on h i s property
free from the above described c o n d i t i o n s and i t e m s , then a f t e r a ten day
written n o t i c e t o .so comply and the f a i l u r e of the p r o p e r t y owner t o so
a c t , the ECC may onter (such entry s h a l l not be deemed a t r e s s p a s s ) upon
such land and dispose of s a i d c o n d i t i o n s or items at the expense of the
owner (due and payable immediately) and any expense incurred thereby s h a l l
be a l i e n a g a i n s t s a i d property i n favor of the FMRPOA u n t i l paid in f u l l
and the c o l l e c t i o n of said expenses s h a l l be p e r m i s s i b l e through a l l l e g a l
means including i n t e r e s t , c o s t s o f court and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s .
11. Only natural f«nces and natural l o o k i n g fences s h a l l be
permitted as boundary l i n e s , no barbed wire or chain l i n k fences may be
used for such purposes. Within the property owner's boundary l i n e s and
a limited area and use only, any type of fence may be used, s u b j e c t t o
ECC approval.

*
Cu
^
*•
*

^

^
^
farq

12. No hunting or firearms of any n a t u r e , s i z e or kind s h a l l be
permitted within the area covered by the Forest Meadow Ranch S u b d i v i s i o n s , f
except within s p e c i f i c a l l y approved a r e a s , i f any, by the ECC.
°J
rx
13. The flow of any stream, creek or s p r i n g may not be stopped
or dammed up nor may any l o t or p a r c e l be i n c r e a s e d in s i z e by f i l l i n g in W
the water that abntts i t . Th* e l e v a t i o n of any l o t s h a l l not be changed
^
so as t o m a t e r i a l l y e f f e c t the s u r f a c e e l e v a t i o n or grade of the s u r r o u n d - ^
ing l o t s . No rock, gravel or c l a y s h a l l be e x c a v a t e d or removed from any
l o t for commercial purposes.

14. All. v a h i c l e * op«Tated on said property s h a l l be p r o p e i l /
£D
l i c e n s e d , i n s p e c t e d and maintained so as not t o c r e a t e a dangerous s i t *^
uation, become a nuisance, nor emit unreasonable smoke, o i l or n o i s e :
^
said v e h i c l e s s n a i l be operated only on the p r o p e r l y defined roads and
£5
rights-of-ways and not in any manner which w i l l cause damage or harm to ti-tr-j
natural environment and landscape of s a i d property.
The ECC s h a l l have
the power to r e s t r i c t the use of any v e h i c l e which c r e a t e s such a nusiancc
or noise so as to prevent the majority from the proper enjoyment of t h e i r
property.
15, Extramo caution must be e x e r c i s e d in the handling of f i r e ,
therefore no open f i r e s s h a l l be permitted except in areas and/or device
such as f i r e p i t s , approved by the ECC. A f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r s h a l l bo
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^required before any fire of any size may be started (ignited). The V.cc
shall properly provide notice of these requirements to all property users
and set up fines and penalties for thero violation.
16.
The development of facilities for the disposal of sewage
waste shall be accomplished only after approval and inspection of and in
accordance with rules and regulations of the Utah State Division of
Health and the Summit County Health Department and specifically Part IV
of the Code of Waste Disposal Regulations$ Utah State Division of Health.
17,
Dcscvct Diversified Development, does reserve the right with
respect to the property covered hereby to determine the course, extent and
direction of any casowefits necessary tor the purpose of installing and
maintaining any publ:c utility facilities and for such other purposes
common!- incidental to the development of said property. All claims for
damages, if any, arising out of the construction, maintenance and repair
of utilities or on account of temporary or other inconvenience caused
thereby against Deseret Diversified n*v*lopm«nt# or any utility company
or municipality, or any of its agents or servants are*hereby waived by
the owners. Deseret Diversified Development docs further reserve the
right to change, establish, lay out a now, or discontinue any road, .street,
right-of-vAy or casement which may be at any time established necessary
or not necessary for ingress or egress to and from an owner1s lot, subject
to the approval of an/ governmental authority, it required. The property
convoyed in Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions are so conveyed subj^rr to
the right of Dcseiet Diversified Development, as in this Paragraph 17
provided, which right may be exercised by Deserot niv*rsifiod Development
without compensation to a property owner.
IB.
In the event Deseret Diversified Development or FMRPOA
desire or are required by any governmental authority to develop improvements, including but not limited to electricity, gas, telephone, sewers,
water, etc.. all property owners, occupants, users O T their assigns of
the real property covered hereby shall connect to and become a user of
said faculties within o reasonable time after installation and shall
be responsible for their proportionate share of the development expenses, OsJ
costs and charges. Said proportionate share shall be calculated on a
O^
per*acre or portion thereof basis-and due thirty days before constructionJJ\
LU
The violation of any of the reservations or covenants
<-0
19,
h*r«in sot out by any property owner, occupant, or person claiming under **
ri
them or any .other porson shall be subiect to prosecution by any other
property owner of the real property included herein, the FMRPOA or
Deseret Diversified Development, said prosecution may tako the form
^J
of any le^al proceeding in law or equity against the offending person or ^°v
persons and way seek any and all lawful remedy therefor. In addition to
^
the tort going rights, the FMRPOA, the BCC or Deseret Diversified Develop^
roent jointly or severally, shall have the right, whenever there shall
^
have been built on any lot any structure which is in violation of these
£g
restrictions, to inter
upon the property where such violation of these
Reservations and Restrictions exists and summarily abate or remov? the
same at the expense of the uwncr, which expense snail become a lien upon
the property from which rcraovod and any such entry and abatement or removal
shall not be doomed a trespass. The failure promptly to enforce any of
the Reservations and Restrictions shall not bar their enforcement.
20,
Invalidation o£ any of t.h* provisions of thia document by
judgment or court order shall in no wise affect any of the other provisions
herein, which shall remain in full force and effect:.
^ *
21.
Should the owner fail, neglect or rnfuso ZO satisfy and
*"*"*
discharge any fine, lien or penalty arising, hereunder within thirty
°^
(-0) days, or it should becomo necessary to enforce the provisions h e r e i n , ^
the FMRPOA, th* ECC and/or Deseret Diversified Development a- the case
^
may be, shall hpv* th* right to interest on such fine, lien «~r penalty
Q_
at the rate of one and one-half percent per month until paid and shall be
entitled to roceivc all costs of collection and/or enforcement including
.
a reasonable attorney's fee.
J^
22.
The reservations and restrictive covenants herein set out
are to run vith the land and shall be binding upon ail persons owning
or occupying any lot, parcel or portion of the real property enumerated
at the beginning hereoi until January 1, 1990, and for successive twenty
(20) year periods unless within six (6) mnnths of the end of the initial

^
^
JQQ
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period or any twenty (20) ye*r

period thereafter a written agreement

executed by the then record owners of more than three-quarters (7>/4) in
aren of ssid real property included herein is recorded with tl;e Summit

County Recorder and the terms of said agreement change, modify or extinguish
in whole or in part the reservations and restrictive covenants enumerated
herein. Thereafter, these reservations and restrictive covenants as
changed, modified,or extinguished by said agreement shall continue in force
for successive twenty (20) year periods, until they are changed, modified
or extinguished in the manner herein provided,
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT hns
caused this document to be executed in its name by its President, thi3
f ** day of July, 1971.
DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT

2

""^^zfe^

ATTEST:

v

m^dtXtJmt^aSCX^^' •*

.secretary
ecretary

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
0n

che

ss.

j£_Lda>r

o f

me

Jul

y>

19

^1 p e r s o n a l l y appeared before

, who, b e i n g by me duly sworn, did

say t h a t he i s the President of Deseret D i v e r s i f i e d Development and
that s a i d instrument was s i g n e d in b e h a l f o£ s a i d corporation by authori t y . o ^ L t s ^ y f laws , and s a i d

<u>. &

» ~ # ^

acJC^i^e*9^4^wJRe that said corporation executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at.:3^/C^wZL&
My Commission Expires:
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "3" - THE 1972 PLAT OF FOREST MEADOW RANCH
PLAT "D"
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "4" - MAP SHOWING RELATIONSHIP OF FOREST
MEADOW RANCH PLAT "D" TO SECTION 22, SECTION 21, AND LOT 105A
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "5" -1980 NOTICE OF LD2N.
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Pine Meadow Ranch Association
1104 Ashton Avenue #203
Salt Lake City, Utah 841G6

NOTICE OF LIEN
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That pursuant to that certain document entitled "Reservations
and Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch" dated July 8, 1971
and filed for record July 22, 1971 as entry No. 113593, Book No.
M32 in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State
of Utah and also that certain document entitled "Reservations and
Protective Covenants, Pine Meadow Ranch", dated August 15, 1973
and filed for record on September 28, 1973 as entry 120967, Book No. M-50,
office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State of Utah,
Pine Meadow Ranch Association, a Utah non-profit corporation,
claims a continuing lien upon the following described real property
for the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share
fees, special maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any
or all of said items:
Plat A, Pine Meadov/ Ranch, Lots 1 through 81
Plat B, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 49
Plat C, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 06>
Plat D, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 104
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat A, Lots 1 through 14
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat B, Lots 15 through 39
Forest Meadow Ranch Dlat C, Lots 40 through 86
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D, Lots 86 through 181
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that prior to the sale or conveyance of
any said real property, a Certificate of Good Standing should be
obtained therefor from the Pine Meadov; Ranch Assocxation, 1104 Ashton
Avenue, Suite 203, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, indicating that: all
outstanding assessments have been paid in full; otherwise a purchaser
may be responsible for payment of prior delinquent assessments.
Dated:
Pine Meadow Ranch Association

By
It *l^ President

Q

STATE OF UTAH
COUNT* OF SALT LAKE

J*

, 1980, personally appeared
day of ^fLU'VOn the
bofore me Gerald P Langton, the/ sWner of the foregoing ir)i".trora>?nt,
who duly acknowledged
id to me thax he* executed the same. /'*»!-'^ ***.' *,

o
—I

Notary ,1/ubl IC
Residing a t :
M

yCofTlfTV^ ^ o

'-/

T /

/££/

''*
'*
n £*,
'+«* Oct l ? . , 961
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "6" - OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS.

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

JUN 3 0 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

Forest Meadow Ranch Property
Owners Association, L.L.C,
Petitioner and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 20040397-CA
F I L E D
(June 30, 2005)

v.
Pine Meadow Ranch Home
Association aka Pine Meadow
Ranch Home Owners Association
and as Pine Meadow Ranch
Association,

2005 UT App 264

Respondent and Appellee.

Third District, Silver Summit Department, 000600092
The Honorable Bruce Lubeck
Attorneys: Boyd Kimball Dyer, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Edwin C. Barnes and Walter A. Romney, Jr., Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
fl
Petitioner Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association,
L.L.C. appeals the trial court's grant of Respondent Pine Meadow
Ranch Home Association's motion for summary judgment.
Specifically, Petitioner argues that, as a matter of law,
Respondent's lien is unenforceable because (1) the 1971
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (the 1971 CC&Rs), as the
basis for the lien, violate Utah's statute of frauds, see Utah
Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1998) ; (2) the doctrine of descriptio
personae applies; (3) the 1971 CC&Rs do not run with the land for
want of privity; (4) the beneficiary of a trust may not encumber
trust property; (5) the doctrine of uniformity applies; and (6)
the lien violates Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 38-9-1 to -7 (2001). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
f2
The essential facts are not disputed. In 1965, F.E. and
M.P. Bates executed a duly recorded warranty deed (the Bates
Deed), conveying land, part of which later became known as the
Forest Meadow Subdivision,1 to Security Title Company (Security) .
In the Bates Deed, Security was listed as "trustee," but no
beneficiary or trust was described.
f3
On March 18, 1971, W. Brent Jensen (Jensen)2 created Deseret
Diversified Development, Inc. (Deseret) by filing its articles of
incorporation with the Secretary of State.
^4
On July 8, 1971, Deseret, identifying itself as the "owner"
of the "described premises"--"The South half of Section 22,
Township 1 South, [ ] Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian"4
--executed the 1971 CC&Rs. The 1971 CC&Rs were signed by Jensen,
as president of Deseret, and stated that "[t]he reservations and
restrictive covenants herein set out are to run with the land."
While the 1971 CC&Rs make no specific reference to annual
homeowners association assessments, they do provide for a
homeowners association to administer and enforce the 1971 CC&Rs.
f5
Later in 1972, Deseret and Security, described as owners,
recorded Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D" (Plat D) . Plat D created

1. Another portion of the land transferred in the Bates Deed
became the Pine Meadow Subdivision. At some point, the
homeowners associations of the Forest Meadow Subdivision and the
Pine Meadow Subdivision merged, thereafter operating as a single
entity. It appears that their merger resulted in an
unincorporated association rather than a corporation or other
business entity.
2. Jensen wore many hats. For instance, he was president of
both Security and Deseret, as well as developer of both the
Forest Meadow and Pine Meadow Subdivisions.
3. "Township 1 South" was an incorrect description. The
relevant property should have been described as "Township 1
North." Later, on August 19, 1971, to correct this error, Jensen
rerecorded the 1971 CC&Rs altered only to reflect the appropriate
description. The rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs were properly stamped and
referenced the book and page numbers of the original recording.
4. Petitioner's property--Lot 105A--is partially within the
north half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian and partially within the south half of the
same.

the Forest Meadow Subdivision and marked the boundaries of Lot
105.
%6 On January 15, 1975, Security conveyed title to Lot 105, by
special warranty deed, to Jensen Investment, Jensen Investment
took the deed "[s]ubject to easements, restrictions, reservations
and rights of way appearing of record or enforceable in law and
equity." This deed was recorded January 16, 1975. That same
day, Jensen Investment conveyed by warranty deed the eastern half
of Lot 105--Lot 105A--to C.E. and S.M. Clark (the Clarks), only
to have the Clarks quitclaim Lot 105A back to Jensen Investment.
It is alleged that the design of this transaction was to
recombine Lot 105; however, it is unclear from the record what
Jensen Investment gained by this transaction.
U7
On July 22, 1975, Jensen Investment conveyed Lot 105A to
H.E. and M.C. Waldhouse (the Waldhouses) by warranty deed. This
deed was recorded July 23, 1975.
1f8
In 1980, Respondent recorded a notice of lien (the 1980
Notice of Lien), citing the 1971 CC&Rs, and claiming that Lot
105A, among others, had a "continuing lien" against it "for the
payment of annual maintenance assessment[s]."
119 On December 12, 1988, the Waldhouses conveyed Lot 105A to
S.J. Oakanson aka S.J. Liftos by warranty deed, but reserved Lot
105A's oil, gas, and mineral rights. This deed was recorded
December 13, 198 8.
HlO On October 15, 1998, S.J. Oakanson granted Lot 105A to Axel
Grabowski by warranty deed, "subject to easements, restrictions
and rights of way currently of record." This deed was recorded
October 29, 1998.
Kll On December 9, 1999, Axel Grabowski quitclaimed Lot 105A to
Petitioner--an "association" consisting solely of Axel Grabowski.
This deed was recorded December 10, 1999.
1|12 In 2003, Respondent recorded a-clarification to the 1980
Notice of Lien (the 2003 Clarification), submitting that the 1980
Notice of Lien created no new lien, but rather, merely
republished the existing CC&Rs.
fl3 Respondent currently has an annual budget of approximately
$140,000, consisting mostly of proceeds from annual homeowners
assessments on over 800 lots. Respondent claims that it uses
this money to provide its members benefits, such as maintaining
and insuring private roads, open spaces, and power lines
throughout the subdivisions. Respondent also contends that

membership in the homeowners association is mandatory via the
1971 CC&Rs.
fl4 Petitioner, seeking to avoid Respondents assertion of
authority over Lot 105A, originally filed an action for summary
relief under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, see Utah Code Ann.
§§ 38-9-1 to -7, arguing that Deseret did not have any interest
in the property when it recorded the 1971 CC&Rs, Thereafter, the
parties conducted discovery. In late 2003, the parties asked the
trial court to determine the case on summary judgment, indicating
that there were "no facts to try." In 2004, the trial court
granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment and denied
Petitioner's like motion.
Ul5 In the course of reviewing Respondent's proposed judgment,
Petitioner discovered the discrepancy between the originally
recorded 1971 CC&Rs and the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs--"Township 1
South" on the original 1971 CC&Rs and "Township 1 North" on the
rerecorded CC&Rs. Petitioner thereafter referred to the
rerecorded CC&Rs as the "Fabricated 1971 CC&Rs," and brought a
second motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the
rerecorded CC&Rs were invalid, and thus, Lot 105A was not within
the description of the 1971 CC&Rs. The trial court denied
Petitioner's second motion for summary judgment. Petitioner
appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Kl6 Petitioner appeals the trial court's grant of Respondent's
motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper only
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and "the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.
Civ. P. 56<c). When reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion
for summary judgment, this court reviews for correctness, giving
no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, and
considers all evidence and reasonable inferences derived
therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party below.
See Black v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004 UT 66,^9, 100 P.3d 1163.
ANALYSIS
fl7 Arguing that the trial court erred in granting Respondent's
motion for summary judgment, Petitioner asserts that, as a matter
of law, Respondent's lien is unenforceable because (1) the 1971
CC&Rs violate Utah's statute of frauds, see Utah Code Ann. § 255-1; (2) the doctrine of descriptio personae applies; (3) the
1971 CC&Rs do not run with the land for want of privity; (4) the
beneficiary of a trust may not encumber trust property; (5) the

doctrine of uniformity applies; and (6) the lien violates Utah's
Wrongful Lien Statute, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1 to -7.
A.

Utah's Statute of Frauds

fl8 In the instant case, we encounter a correction that modifies
previously filed CC&Rs. "Because covenants that run with the
land must be based on some interest in land, the statute of
frauds must be satisfied." Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton
Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 629 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted).
Likewise, a correction to a covenant running with the land must
also satisfy the statute of frauds. See R.T. Nielson Co. v.
Cook, 2002 UT 11,1[13 n.4, 40 P.3d 1119 (noting "that if an
original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent
agreement that modifies the original agreement must also satisfy
the requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable.11).
fl9 Petitioner avers that Utah's statute of frauds prevents
enforcement of the 1971 CC&Rs against Lot 105A, noting that the
1971 CC&Rs were originally recorded with an error in the
description of the affected property--"Township 1 South." While
Deseret later rerecorded the 1971 CC&Rs with the proper
description--"Township 1 North"--Petitioner claims the rerecorded
1971 CC&Rs violated the statute because they were identical to
the originally recorded 1971 CC&Rs save the first page, which
corrected the description. Therefore, Petitioner claims that the
signature appearing on the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs applied only to
the original 1971 CC&Rs, and thus, did not satisfy the statute of
fraudsr s subscription requirement.
^[20 Respondent counters that the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs merely
corrected a scrivener's error, and this was deemed an acceptable
remedy by the Summit County Clerk.
f21

Utah's statute of frauds states:
No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one
year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner
relating thereto, shall be created, granted,

5. The Utah Supreme Court in R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT
11, 40 P.3d 1119, uses the term "modification." Id. at fl3 n.4.
However, because a "correction" is "the act or an instance of
making right what is wrong," Black's Law Dictionary 347 (7th ed.
1999), and a "modification" is "a change to something," id. at
1020, it follows that a correction is a modification, although
the reverse is not necessarily true.

assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise
than by act or operation of law, or by deed
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the
party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. Because the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs were
no doubt in writing, if they were subscribed by Deseret, then the
statute of frauds is not an impediment to their enforcement.
f22 "Subscribed" generally means physically signed. See Black's
Law Dictionary 1441 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "subscription" as
"[t]he act of signing one's name on a document."). Ultimately^
subscription requires covenants to have attached to them a
signature of an authorized party, thereby authenticating the
document. It does not matter that the signature was originally
put to paper for another document. See 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds § 273 (2001) . What is essential, however, is that the
signing party intend for the signature to have effect on the
document to which it is attached. See id. Indeed, "[t]he
statute may be satisfied by the act of the parties in adopting
their signatures on an old contract to authenticate a new
agreement." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Prigge v. Olsen, 47
N.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Neb. 1951) ("A signature to satisfy the
statute of frauds may be on any appropriate writing placed there
by the party to be bound or authorized, adopted, or appropriated
by him with the intent, actual or apparent, to give force and
effect to the writing.").
1123 Here, there is no evidence or indication suggesting Deseret
intended to deceive, mislead, or act fraudulently. Deseret
adopted the original subscription in the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs,
evidenced by the presence of the original, as well as the new
recordation information on the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs. This
historical recordation information on the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs
squares with the apparent intent of the signer--Jensen--to
subdivide and develop the land granted in the Bates Deed.
Indeed, the same party filed both the original and the rerecorded
1971 CC&Rs, both of which were accepted by the Summit County
Clerk's office. Furthermore, there were no intervening actions.
Thus, the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs were validly subscribed, and
therefore, withstand Petitioner's statute of frauds challenge.
B.

The Doctrine of Descriptio Personae

f24 "Descriptio personae" is a doctrine whereby a court
disregards tangential titles added to a person's name or
signature. See TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70,f8, 66 P. 3d
1031 (defining "descriptio personae" as "'the use of a word or

phrase merely to identify or point out the person intended and
not as an intimation that the language in connection with which
it occurs is to apply to him only in the technical character
which might appear to be indicated by the word1" (quoting Dann v.
Team Bank, 788 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)). This
doctrine was validated by the Utah Supreme Court in Boise Cascade
Corp. v. Stonewood Development Corp., 655 P.2d 668 (Utah 1982).
See TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at %9.
f25 Petitioner contends that Respondent shoulders the burden to
show both that a trust existed and that descriptio personae does
not apply to the Bates Deed--wherein Security took title as
"trustee" without evidence of the existence of a trust or
beneficiary. Petitioner continues that if descriptio personae
applies, Security was the outright fee owner of Lot 105A,
rendering any CC&Rs filed by Deseret unauthorized.
Alternatively, Petitioner claims that if this court rules
descriptio personae inapplicable, nevertheless, Deseret could not
have been the intended beneficiary of any trust because Deseret
was not incorporated until March 18, 1971, years after the
execution and delivery of the Bates Deed.
^26 Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that descriptio
personae does not automatically shift the burden to it to show
the trust's existence. Furthermore, Respondent claims that,
descriptio personae notwithstanding, extrinsic evidence indicates
Security was trustee for the benefit of interests that later
became Deseret.
1(27 Both parties rely on TWN, 2003 UT App 70. In TWN, a grantor
twice conveyed a parcel of real property. See id. at ^ 3 - 4 . In
the first instance, the grantor, listing himself on the deed as
"Richard Christensen, Trustee," conveyed the parcel to the
defendant. See id. at ^|3. Later, the grantor, this time
identifying himself on the deed only as "Richard Christensen, ff
conveyed the parcel to the plaintiff. See id. at f 4. The trial
court granted the plaintiff's motion fox summary judgment,
reasoning that, in the first conveyance, the grantor did not
convey his personal interest in the parcel; rather, the first
"deed conveyed only whatever interest Mr. Christensen held on
behalf of an unnamed trust, which was apparently nothing." Id.
at f5 (footnote omitted). This court, however, reversed, ruling:
"The unexplained use of the word 'trustee1 on a real property
deed does not, absent other circumstances suggesting the creation
or existence of a trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust
interest." Id. at ^12. We went on to enumerate two, apparently
exhaustive, methods for a trustee to overcome the descriptio
personae presumption. See id. at fl4\ First, " [a] trusteegrantor should include on the deed such language as ' in my
capacity as trustee for the XYZ trust, ,H Id. "Alternatively, as

the Utah Supreme Court suggested in Boise Cascade Corp., [655
P. 2d at 669,] a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show
that a trust was, in fact, intended." TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at
fl4. Absent a showing of one of these circumstances, "the
presumption of descriptio personae will apply, and the deed will
operate as if the word 'trustee1 were not there," Id. (emphasis
omitted).
K2 8 In this case, because Security did not include in the deed
language such as "in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ trust, "
descriptio personae will presumptively apply unless Respondent
presented sufficient extrinsic evidence to the trial court "to
show that a trust was, in fact, intended." Id.
^29 Here, unlike TWN, there were no competing title interests or
claims when the 1971 CC&Rs were filed. Indeed, it is undisputed
that Petitioner's title traces back to Security, which took title
as "trustee." Additionally, Security is a title company, an
organization that often holds title to property as trustee. Seef
e.g. , Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, 86 P.3d 699 (designating a
title company as trustee); Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d
1366, 1369 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (same). Furthermore, in Plat D,
Deseret was listed as subdivider and owner, and Security was
identified as trustee and owner. While Jensen was certainly
cavalier in his documentation, this extrinsic evidence is
sufficient to overcome the presumption of descriptio personae.
Because we determine that a trust was intended, we must next
assess whether Deseret may be a beneficiary of that trust.
^30 Generally, a private trust must have "a definite
beneficiary." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402 (1) (c) (Supp. 2004).
Respondent urges that the interests that later became Deseret
were the saLme as the beneficiaries of the trust naming Security
as trustee, and that those beneficiaries were sufficiently
definite. Indeed, the facts appear to support this conclusion
that Deseret was the beneficial owner despite the lack of
comprehensive documentation. Jensen signed on behalf of both
Security and Deseret; listed himself as president of Security and
incorporator of Deseret; and utilized the term "trustee" only for
Security. Moreover, Deseret signed the 1971 CC&Rs as beneficial
owner and developer. Such evidence is consistent with a scheme
in which Deseret would oversee the development of the property
granted in the Bates Deed. As such, we conclude the word
"trustee" on the 1971 CC&Rs, together with extrinsic evidence,
reflect the existence of a trust, with Deseret as beneficiary.

C.

Privity of Estate

^31 Petitioner next posits that the 1971 CC&Rs fail to run with
the land for want of privity, and therefore, are unenforceable
against Lot 105A.
f32 "It is well-established that, if- recorded, the documents
setting forth the plat designations for general plan developments
can have the effect of creating restrictive covenants that are
binding on all subsequent development." View Condo. Owners
Assoc, v. MSICO, L L C . 2004 UT App 104,1(16, 90 P.3d 1042. As
the CC&Rs in the instant case were recorded, they may create
enforceable covenants that run with the land. "Further, although
subsequent purchasers may not have had an interest in the
property at the time that the general plan was enacted, the law
holds that those purchasers are entitled to enforce any covenants
that may have been validly created." Id. Thus, the fact that
Respondent did not exist when the CC&Rs were created does not
necessarily prevent Respondent from enforcing the CC&Rs.
f 33 At law, " [a] covenant that runs with the land must have the
following characteristics: (1) The covenant must 'touch and
concern1 the land; (2) the covenanting parties must intend the
covenant to run with the land; . . . (3) there must be privity of
estate"; and (4) the covenant must be in writing. Flying Diamond
Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622-23, 629 (Utah
1989) (footnotes omitted). Petitioner challenges only the
privity element.
1[34 "Privity of estate requires a particular kind of
relationship between the original covenantor and the covenantee."
Id. at 628. There are three types of privity of estate: (1)
mutual--"a covenant arising from simultaneous interests in the
same land"; (2) horizontal--"a covenant created in connection
with a conveyance of an estate from one of the parties to
another"; and (3) vertical--"the devolution of an estate burdened
or benefitted by a covenant from an original covenanting party to
a successor." Id. When investigating the existence of privity,
substance should prevail over technical form. See id. at 628
n.13 (referencing Neponsit Prop. Owner's Assfn v. Emigrant Indus.
Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 798 (N.Y. 1938)).
f35 "[P]rivity exists here on traditional grounds." Id. For
instance, there is horizontal privity here because the 1971 CC&Rs
were created in anticipation of subdividing and selling lots.

Furthermore, vertical privity exists because Petitioner is a
successor to the estate of the original covenanting parties.6
D.

Beneficiary's Power to Encumber Trust Property

^36 Petitioner next argues that because Deseret had only a
beneficial interest in the land granted in the Bates Deed,
Deseret could not encumber Lot 105A. However, Petitioner cites
no authority stating that a beneficiary cannot encumber the trust
res. In fact, there is authority to the contrary. See Capital
Assets Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9,fl7, 994 P.2d 201
(holding beneficial interest in real property could encumber that
interest). In any event, we will not lose sight of the forest
for the trees. Deseret1s actions were subsequently ratified by
Security when Deseret and Security filed Plat D. As such, it is
disingenuous to suggest that Security did not know about the 1971
CC&Rs because Deseret and Security were working together.
Indeed, Security later transferred title to the lots to Deseret
to develop, further manifesting their collaboration. In the end,
the 1971 CC&Rs became contracts between the homeowners
association and its members. Further, the homeowners association
operated pursuant to its bylaws to make assessments; maintain and
insure private roads, open spaces, and power lines; and provide
other benefits to its members.
E.

Doctrine of Uniformity

^3 7 Petitioner avers that the doctrine of uniformity prohibits
the enforcement of the 1971 CC&Rs because they govern only the
northern part of Lot 105A. However, the doctrine of uniformity
has not been adopted in Utah. Furthermore, because Petitioner
has not demonstrated a lack of sufficient uniformity among
similarly situated owners, we need not address whether the
doctrine of uniformity should apply in Utah.
F. Wrongful Lien Statute
^38 Finally, Petitioner asserts that the 1980 Notice of Lien
Respondent filed against Lot 105A is wrongful because it is not
authorized by the 1971 CC&Rs. The 1980 Notice of Lien states
that, based on the 1971 CC&Rs, Respondent "claims a continuing
lien upon [Lot 105A among others] for the payment of annual
maintenance assessment[s] ." Thus, it appears that Respondent's

6. "Vertical privity exists in all covenant situations except
where a successor to the burdened or benefitted land is an
adverse possessor or a disseisor." Flying- Diamond Oil Corp. v.
Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 628 n.12 (Utah 1989} (quotations
and citation omitted) .

lien was grounded in the 1971 CC&Rs, rather than the 1980 Notice
of Lien itself. Therefore, the 1980 Notice of Lien merely
republished the 1971 CC&Rs.
CONCLUSION
f39 First, the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs were adequately subscribed
because Deseret adopted the subscription from the original 1971
CC&Rs. Second, there is sufficient extrinsic evidence indicating
the existence of a trust with Deseret as beneficiary to overcome
the presumptive application of descriptio personae. Third,
traditional notions of privity of estate exist, allowing the 1971
CC&Rs to run with the land. Fourth, Security, as trustee,
ratified beneficiary Deseretfs encumbrance of Lot 105A. Fifth,
the doctrine of uniformity has not been adopted in Utah, and
Petitioner did not allege facts sufficient to warrant an
examination of the doctrine in this case. Finally, the 1980
Notice of Lien was not a new lien, but rather merely republished
the existing 1971 CC&Rs.
f40

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling.

f41

WE CONCUR:
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